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Abstract
Stock market behavior of individual investors is highly correlated with stock
market behavior of their co-workers. For example, a ten percentage point increase
in the fraction of co-workers that purchase stocks in a given month is associated
with a two percentage point increase in the likelihood of individuals making a
purchase. The high correlation exists even after taking controlling for individual
socio-demographic characteristics and for time, stock, zip code, and plant xed
e¤ects. Using data on family relations and on residential zip code, we show that
the high correlation is not driven by peer e¤ects at the family or zip code level.
Moreover, workplace peer e¤ects appear to be strong relative to geographical peer
e¤ects.
Keywords: individual investors, peer e¤ects, portfolio, social interaction, stock
market, stock selection.
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A fundamental observation about human society is that people who communicate regu-
larly with one another think similarly. There is at any place and in any time a Zeitgeist, a
spirit of the times. . . .Word-of-mouth transmission of ideas appears to be an important
contributor to day-to-day or hour-to-hour stock market uctuations. Shiller (2000, p.
148, 155)
1 Introduction
Investment decisions made by individual investos may be inuenced by the individuals
that they interact with. If su¢ ciently correlated, trades based on social interaction might
even a¤ect asset prices. Although the literature has long acknowledged the existence of
social interaction e¤ects among individual investors (e.g., Shiller, 1984, Pound and Shiller,
1989, Hong et al., 2004), lack of data has made it di¢ cult to test for this mechanism.1
In this paper we examine a novel channel for social interaction between individual stock
market investors: the workplace. We assess how co-workers can a¤ect the stock market
behavior of individuals.2 The social psychology literature emphasizes the strength of
face-to-face communication between individuals that frequently interact in producing and
altering beliefs.3 Individuals spend a considerable fraction of their time at the workplace,
and even the most e¢ cient rms create opportunities for face-to-face communication; by
the water-cooler, during lunch, or at company outings. In fact, such social interaction is
often encouraged. It is plausible that conversations at work occasionally center on the
1Existing studies nd mixed support. Using weekly data from China, Feng and Seasholes (2004) nd
that individual investorspurchase decisions are correlated, but driven by common reaction to locally
available news rather than word-of-mouth e¤ects. Using quarterly data from a discount brokerage house in
the U.S., Ivkovic and Weissbenner (2007) nd that individual investorspurchase decisions are correlated
at the zip code level. The correlation is higher in states with a high level of sociability.
2The literature on informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Elison and
Fudenberg, 1993) provide reasons why information (correct or not) obtained from co-workers may be an
important factor in asset allocation. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) construct a theory in which stock
market behavior may be inuenced by social interaction.
3In a classic study byAsch (1955) individuals alone and in groups compared the lengths of line seg-
ments. The lengths were su¢ ciently di¤erent that, when responding alone, such that very few wrong
answers were given. Yet when placed in a group in which all other members were instructed to give
the same wrong answers, individuals frequently gave wrong answers. See Shiller (1995, 2000) for further
references.
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stock market, and that these conversations can a¤ect individual behavior. For example,
investors pick among a dizzying number of individual stocks when evaluating which to buy,
and may obtain information from discussions with their colleagues, or make inferences
based on observing their decisions. Or, conversations with colleagues can simply raise
awareness of or trust in equity markets and make trading more likely (Guiso and Japelli,
2003, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2010). Duo and Saez (2003) document strong
evidence of workplace interaction in a related context. They use a randomized trial to
document that social interaction inuences the decision to enroll in a tax deferred account
scheme.4
In order to examine the e¤ects of co-workers on stock market behavior, we use a
unique matched employeremployee panel data set from Norway. The dataset has annual
observations on the entire labor market, which allows us to track individuals as they move
between plants over time. Because we are able to match individuals to plants, we also know
who each individuals colleagues are in every year.5 We combine the matched employer-
employee dataset with yearly socio-demographic information at individual level, including
information about family relationships and residential zip code. This data is merged with
a complete record of common stock transactions made by Norwegian individual investors
in the period 1994-2005. To avoid capturing e¤ects via employee stock programs, we
exclude plants that are belong to publicly listed companies.
We study whether an individual makes a purchase in a given month, and link it to
the fraction of their co-workers that make a purchase, controlling for individual socio-
demographic characteristics. The e¤ects are large: a ten percentage point increase in
the fraction of co-workers that make a purchase in a given month is associated with an
increase of two percentage points in the individuals propensity to make a purchase. An
advantage of our data is that we can examine peer e¤ects also at a much more detailed
level; in the selection of individual stocks. We nd that a ten percentage point increase in
the fraction of co-workers that purchase a particular stock is associated with an increase
of 1:7 percentage points in the individuals own purchase of that stock. This result, which
4In a di¤erent context Gompers et al. (2005, p. 612) argue that when working with colleagues who
have been involved in startups, employees learn from their coworkers about what it takes to start a new
rm.One can easily see envisage similar mechanisms for stock market activity.
5There are 50 people employed in the median rm in our dataset.
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continues to hold after including stock xed e¤ects, is quite striking given that there are
hundreds of stocks listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Stock market activity could be correlated at the plant level due to other reasons than
conversations between colleagues. We apply panel data techniques in order to address
concerns about common unobservables. Plant and zip code xed e¤ects account for time-
invariant systematic di¤erences. Including yearly socio-demographic variables as controls
make it unlikely that our results are driven by individual xed e¤ects. Monthly (stock-
level) xed e¤ects remove the inuence of market-wide news releases, and of extrapolation
from past returns. Industry-month xed e¤ects remove the inuence of trade journals and
other industry-specic events. Plant peer e¤ects are both economically and statistically
strong after taking into account xed e¤ects.
A possibility nevertheless remains that the workers of a particular plant experience
common shocks (such as bonus payments) that are unobservable. In order to address
this issue, we study individuals that change place of work. We consider how the relation
between the trading decision of co-workers and the individual evolves over time. Figure 1
illustrates how the e¤ect of old (new) co-workers decreases (increases) signicantly when
the individual leaves (joins) the new plant (see section 3.1 for details). We nd that old
peers a¤ect individual choices after the investors has moved from the plant albeit at a
lower rate, which is suggestive of word-of-mouth e¤ects.6
A natural question is whether our results are driven by neighborhood e¤ects. This
could be the case, for example, if co-workers tend to live in the same area. Because
we have matched socio-demographic information for the entire population of Norway we
can identify both neighbors and family members, and control for peer e¤ects along these
dimensions. Our analysis suggests that the impact of zip code peers is signicantly reduced
when workplace and family peers are introduced. In contrast, the impact of workplace
peers is much less a¤ected by the introduction of the other peer groups and socioeconomic
control variables.
6One can also argue that although the domain of common unobservable shocks that could a¤ect the
number of individuals that purchase a stock could be quite large, the domain of common unobservable
shocks that leads to the purchase of the same stock is much less restricted.
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Figure 1. Co-worker and individual trading.
To assess workplace peer e¤ects further, we can compare their magnitude to the mag-
nitude of family and zip code peer e¤ects. Our results suggest that workplace peer e¤ects
are comparable in magnitude to the peer e¤ects inside the family, and are quite large
compared to peer e¤ects at the zip code level. For example, increasing the fraction of
co-workers that make a stock purchase by one standard deviation (6:32 percentage points)
increases the probability of making a purchase by 1:08 percentage points. In contrast,
increasing the fraction of geographical peers that make a purchase by one standard devi-
ation (1:63 percentage points) increases the predicted probability of making a purchase
by 0:44 percentage points.
Further, we consider whether peer purchases yield abnormal returns. We nd that
co-worker peer purchases are neither associated with positive abnormal performance or
negative abnormal performance. However, since we have abstracted from transaction
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costs, peer e¤ects could be detrimental in so far that it might result in excessive amounts
of trading. This suggest that investors respond to communication from peers even though
this communication does not appear to contain valuable information.
To sum up, we analyze a new channel for social interaction between stock market
investors: the workplace, and nd strong evidence of peer e¤ects both in the timing of
purchases and in stock selection. The e¤ects are robust to including xed e¤ects that
control for unobserved heterogeneity at the plant, geographical and stock level.
Our paper connects to the literature in several ways. Most importantly, while the
literature on institutional investors in the stock market nds strong evidence of social
interaction and network e¤ects (Hong et al., 2005, Cohen et al., 2007, Cohen et al., 2010),
the evidence on social interaction among individual investors in the stock market (Feng
and Seasholes, 2004, Ivkovic and Weissbenner, 2007) has been more mixed. We consider a
novel channel for peer e¤ects; the workplace, and contribute to the literature by showing
that co-worker investment decisions can explain a substantial amount of heterogeneity in
individual stock market behavior.
The previous literature has considered peer e¤ects along one dimension. A method-
ological innovation of the paper is to accommodate three types of peer e¤ects: at work, in
the family, and in the neighborhood. This allows us to control for alternative peer e¤ects
in the analysis of workplace peer e¤ects. It also allows us to perform a "horse race" be-
tween di¤erent kinds of peer e¤ects. We nd that neighborhood e¤ects can be important,
consistent with Ivkovic and Weissbenner (2007), but obtain more unequivocal a¢ rmative
results for the e¤ects of social interaction in the workplace and, less surprisingly, in the
family. As discussed in Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2002), it is often important
for policy purposes to separate individual and social multiplier e¤ects, the reason being
that the aggregate impact of intervention may be larger than the sum of its e¤ects on
each individuals decision. Consistent with the ndings of Duo and Saez (2003) in the
context of retirement plans, our results suggest that the social multiplier in the workplace
is large both in absolute and relative terms when it comes to stock market behavior.
The paper also connects to a large empirical literature that documents poor asset
allocation in settings related to the workplace. For example, Benartzi (2001) nds that
employees often invest voluntarily in company stock, in spite of the poor hedging prop-
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erties of such investments. Although excessive extrapolation, as suggested by Benartzi
(2001) can explain why individuals invest in stocks with a strong prior performance, this
argument cannot fully explain why they invest in company stock - there are many stocks
with a strong prior performance. Our ndings suggests the possibility that voluntary
investments in company stock may be partially driven by peer e¤ects at the rm level:
one obvious object of workplace conversations is the stock market performance of the
employers stock. Cohen (2008) documents that employees of stand-alone rms invest 10
percentage points more in company stock than conglomerate employees. While excessive
extrapolation cannot explain this pattern, Cohen (2008) argues that it is consistent with
greater loyalty among employees of stand-alone rms. The results of the present paper
suggests a complementary explanation: that social interaction e¤ects, a¤ecting beliefs,
could be stronger at stand-alone rms than at conglomerates.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data.
Section 3 presents the main results on the purchase decision and Section 4 the main
results on stock selection and in Section 5 we consider the performance of peer purchases.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data are proprietary and have been collected from three sources. First, a record of all
common stock trades made on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) by Norwegian residents
from January 1994 to December 2005 was collected from Verdipapirsentralen (the Norwe-
gian Central Securities Depository). For each transaction made by an individual, the data
contain the (anonymized) ID of the individual, the date of transaction, the ticker of the
security and the number of shares bought or sold. Verdipapirsentralen (the Norwegian
Central Securities Depository) is a centralized register where all common stock trades at
the OSE are recorded. To preserve anonymity, the trade records of the 20 most active
investors are not contained in the data. Second, from the OSE we obtained daily ticker
7Doskeland and Hvide (2011) show that individual investors tend to overweigh their holdings of own-
industry stocks. Again we can relate this to social interaction; a natural object of workplace conversations
is the stock market performance of within-industry stocks.
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prices and other company information such as market capitalization and company ID
number. Where needed, we supplemented this information with data from Borsprosjektet
at the Norwegian School of Economics. Third, from the government statistical agency,
Statistics Norway, we obtained register data on the socio-demographic characteristics of
the investors per December 31 from 1986 to 2006. From this data we can identify a num-
ber of peer groups that the individual belongs to. For each individual, the data includes
the plant at which the individual is employed, the ID of the individuals spouse and chil-
dren and the zip code in which the individual lives. We also identify family members;
our family peer group is comprised of parents, grandparents, children, grand children,
siblings, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces and nephews. The socioeconomic data allows us
to control for a number of background variables including income and wealth, age, gen-
der, education, and employer variables such as industry (ve digit NACE code) and an
unique employer ID number. Since the data are collected from government registries,
their reliability are high.
2.1 Peer Groups
Our reference group is the about 460; 000 individuals that make at least one purchase
of a common stock at the Oslo Stock Exchange between 1994 and 2005 (about 10% of
the population of Norway). This is the relevant group when we dene the peer variables.
For each year, we construct the sample of individuals in the following way. (1) In order
for the peer group variables to be dened, we keep individuals that has a) at least one
family member that is also an investor sometime between 1994 and 2005, b) at least one
co-worker that is also an investor between 1994 and 2005, and c) at least one person in
the same zip code that is also an investor between 1994 and 2005. (2) We keep individual
that have full-time employment and is not employed by a listed company or a subsidiary
of a listed company. This is done to ensure that employee stock ownership plans or
investments in company stock are not driving our results. We also exclude individuals
employed in Financial Services (two digit NACE codes 65, 66, and 67) as a simple way
to eliminate professional investors from the sample.
Criterion (1) and (2) leaves us with 227; 790 unique individuals in the year 2000
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(376; 597 over the entire period). From this we sample 20% of all individual months.
Since most individuals appear repeatedly in the dataset this only implies a reduction to
170; 499 unique individuals in the year 2000.8 ;9 These individuals are spread over 2; 798
zip codes and 42; 675 plants. We provide descriptive statistics of the socio-demographic
variables and the size of the peer groups of these individuals in Table A2 in the Appendix.
3 Trade
In this section we relate the decision to trade of peers to the trading decision of the
investor. Since very few individual investors short stocks, considering sell transactions
implies conditioning on the investor already owning stocks. Therefore, we consider only
trades that are purchases.10
We create a dummy variable buyi;t that takes the value 1 if investor i has bought a
stock in month t and 0 otherwise. For our three peer groups we calculate the fraction of
peers that trade in that particular month. We denote these fractions buyplanti;t ; buy
family
i;t
and buyzipi;t respectively. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and main
independent variables for the trade analysis. In any given month 2:12% of all individuals
buy a stock. The mean fraction of plant, family and zip code peers that make a purchase
is 1:97%, 0:93% and 1:83% respectively.
We examine the e¤ect of peers on the decision to trade by estimating the following
linear regression,
buyi;t =  + 1  buyplantt + 2  buyfamilyt + 3  buyzipt + b + "i;t (1)
where dependent and independent variables are dened as above. In the above specica-
tion,   is a column vector of socio-demographic control variables and b is a row vector
of coe¢ cients. Our socio-demographic variables include (and various powers of, see the
caption to Table 2 for specics): age, wealth, labour income, sex and the number of years
8The nal sample contains 329; 634 unique individuals over the entire sample period (1994 to 2005).
9In 2000, about 45; 000 individuals are excluded by criterion (2).
10In unreported analysis we have also considered the decisions to trade and to sell as dependent vari-
ables. The results are qualitatively unchanged.
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of education.11 We include month dummies to control for economy-wide trends in trad-
ing behavior. It is possible that the similarity in trading behavior among co-workers is
driven by other plant specic factors. To control for this we introduce plant xed e¤ects.
Similarly, we introduce zip code and postcode-plant interaction xed e¤ects. It is reason-
able to expect that some part of the trading decision is driven by the industry that the
individual is employed in, perhaps through industry periodicals. To this end we introduce
industry xed e¤ects based on the rst two digits of the NACE code of the industry of
employment of the individual. We cluster our standard errors at the individual level to
control for serial correlation in errors.12
Table 2 presents our regression results. Specications (1) to (3) considers the relation
between one of our peer groups and the trading decision of the individual while speci-
cations (4) to (6) considers pair-wise combinations of the peer groups and (7) includes
all three peer groups. All three peer groups are signicant at the 1% level in all speci-
cations. In terms of economic magnitude, in specication (7) a one standard deviation
increase in co-worker trading activity (buyplantt ) results in an increase in trading activity of
50:98% relative to the unconditional mean. The impact of family and neighbors is lower,
a one standard deviation increase is associated with an increase in trading activity of
27:71% and 20:52% respectively. Thus, co-workers have the largest impact on the trading
decision. Additionally, the introduction of co-workers reduces the impact of neighbors by
roughly 19% (comparing specications (3) and (5)).13
A potential concern is that our results are driven by a particular industry. For example,
it could be the case that the co-worker peer e¤ect is particularly strong in the energy
sector. To mitigate these concerns we (i) include industry xed e¤ects in all of our
specications in Table 2 and (ii) in Appendix 3 we estimate a separate co-worker peer
e¤ect for each of 36 industries that represent a signicant proportion of our sample. The
results overwhelmingly support the notion that co-worker peer e¤ects are universal across
11Appendix 2 contains descriptive statistics of our sociodemographic control variables.
12In unreported results we have also clustered standard errors around month. The resulting t-statistics
are lower, but still highly signicant.
13We have also considered more parsimonious specications without our xed e¤ects. In this case, the
impact of all of our peer groups is signicantly stronger. We also nd that the introduction of socio-
demographic control variables reduces the impact of neighborhood peers disproportionately, suggesting
that the zip code proxies for co-worker interaction and other omitted variables.
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industries. Additionally, we decompose our investor observations (for the entire sample)
according to industry. No single industry accounts for more than 11:37% of our investor
observations.14
It could also be the case that the similarity in trading that we observe is to some
extent driven by common responses to media. In Norway there are 429 municipalites
(kommuner) and even local media serves multiple municipalities and therefore introduc-
ing municipalitymonth xed e¤ects controls for common media shocks. In unreported
analysis we nd that the introduction of these xed e¤ects does not qualitatively change
the co-worker peer e¤ect.15
3.1 New and Former Co-workers
In this section we consider the evolution of peer e¤ects when the investor changes place of
work. Our data contains the end date of employment at the old plant and the start date
of employment at the new plant (see Huttunen, Møen and Salvanes, 2009, for a complete
description of the data). This allows us to examine whether peer e¤ects of old (new) peers
is decreasing (increasing) over time following a move.
For an investor move to be included in our analysis we require that the termination
and start date are both non-missing. At the time of the move, we require that the investor
did not change place of employment in the preceding year or does not change place of
employment in the next year. Additionally, we require that the investor moves at most
four times between 1993 and 2005. Finally, we require that the start date at the new place
of work is later than the stop date at the previous plant. Applying, the above criteria
leaves us with roughly 45; 000 investor moves. Of these moves, roughly 40% are investors
that just move once, another 40% move twice and the remaining investors move three
times (almost no individuals move four times).
To test the relative impact of new and former co-workers we interact our explanatory
14We have also considered specications with industrymonth xed e¤ects. This does not a¤ect the
co-worker peer e¤ect qualitatively suggesting that industry trade journals and the like are not driving
our results.
15Additionally, we have considered whether socio-demographic variables are related to the strength of
co-worker peer e¤ects. We nd that co-workers exert a greater inuence on males, but that there is no
conclusive relation between age or the level of education and the size of the peer e¤ect.
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variables, the fraction of old (buyold) and new (buynew) co-workers that make a purchase,
with dummy variables that takes the value 1 if the date is before / after the stop / start at
the old / new plant and 0 otherwise. For example, the variable buyold beforet is the fraction
of old co-workers that make a purchase prior to the investor leaving the plant and after
the termination date the variable takes a value of 0. Our basic regression estimates
buyi;t = +1buyold beforet +2buyold aftert +3buynew beforet +4buynew aftert +b +"i;t
where the vector of control variables   contains our family (buyfamilyt ) peers, neighbor
(buyzipt ) peers and socio-demographic control variables that we control for in Table 2. We
include month, plant and zip code xed e¤ects. We also include postcode-plant interaction
xed e¤ects.
Our results are presented in Table 3. In specication (1) we consider the change in the
peer e¤ect of old co-workers when the individual leaves the plant. For each individual, we
restrict the sample to 12 months before the individual leaves the plant to 12 months after
leaving. The purchases of former co-workers is positively related to the purchases before
and after the move. However, as expected the e¤ect of former co-workers is greater before
the move than after the move (the point estimate drops from 0:270 to 0:159). The F test
statistic for a di¤erence between 1 and 2 is 16:71 and signicant at the 1% level.
In specication (2) we consider the change in peer e¤ect of new co-workers when
the individual joins the new plant. We restrict the sample to 12 months before the
individual joins the new plant to 12 months after the start date.16 We nd that the
purchasing decision of new co-workers is positively related to the individuals trading
decision. As expected, the impact of new co-workers increases substantially (the point
estimate increases from 0:116 to 0:332) when the individual joins the new plant. The F
statistic for a di¤erence between 3 and 4 is 97:55 and statistically signicant at the 1%
level.
Finally, in specication (3) we simultaneously include the e¤ect of old and new co-
workers before and after the individual leaves (joins) the old (new) plant. For each
16Note that this sample is di¤erent from the sample in specication (1) since for most individuals there
is some time inbetween leaving the old plant and joining the new plant.
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investor, we restrict the sample to 12 months before the investor joins the new plant and
to 12 months after the investor leaves the old plant.
The results in this specication mirrors those in the two previous specications.
Firstly, the e¤ect of co-workers at the old plant is substantial, but signicantly reduced
following the move. Secondly, the e¤ect of new co-workers is substantially increased once
the individual has joined the new plant. Additionally, this specication allows us to com-
pare the impact of individuals that previously have been co-workers to the e¤ect of those
individuals that will become co-workers. The point estimate of buyold aftert is 0:142 while
the point estimate of buynew beforet is 0:0545. This suggests that the individual interacts
with old co-workers even after the individual has left the plant, but that the interaction
with future co-workers is limited.17
;18
It is possible that our results could be driven by common liquidity shocks induced by
severance packages. To control for this possibility we include dummies for the number
of months before leaving from the old plant (in specications 1 and 3), and dummies
for the number of months prior to joining the new plant (specications 2 and 3). Thus,
these xed e¤ects will capture any extra buying intensity in the month after leaving the
old plant due to the individual investing his severance package (or buying less due to job
uncertainty).
Next, we examine the evolution of the e¤ect of peers surrounding the move. To
do this we introduce one dummy variable for each of 12 months before to 12 months
after the investors leaves (joins) the old (new) plant. We interact our dummy variables
with buyplant oldt to examine how the inuence of peers evolve surrounding the move. We
17Interestingly, we nd that future co-workers (buynew beforet ) a¤ect the decision to make a purchase of
the investor. This is likely driven by the investor interacting with his future colleagues and perhaps even
acquiring his future job through these interactions.
18In unreported analysis, we follow Nanda and Sørensen (2010) and consider the impact of placebo
peers on the decision to purchase stock. A placebo peer is someone that during the previous year moved
away from the plant to which the investor moved to in this year. That is, the investor and the peer
have both been exposed to plant specic e¤ects, but they have never overlapped at the same plant.
As expected, we nd no relation between the purchases of placebo peers and the purchase decision of
investors.
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estimate the following regression
buyi;t =  +
12X
i= 12
i  buyplant oldt  j + b + "i;t (2)
The vector   contains family and zip peer control variables with coe¢ cients. Additionally,
we include plant xed e¤ects and time dummies. We run one separate regression for the
old plant and the new plant.
In Figure 1 we have plotted the interacted peer coe¢ cient against the number of
months before the move. For the new plant, there is a striking increase in the e¤ect of
new co-workers following the move. Additionally, the e¤ect of co-workers at the old plant
drops signicantly after the move. 19
3.2 Local and Expertise Trades
There is substantial evidence in the literature that investors show a preference for local
stocks (for example Coval and Moskowitz, 1999 and Huberman, 2001). Additionally,
Døskeland and Hvide (2011) document that investors show a preference for investing
in stocks in industries that they have expertise in. In this section, we verify that our
results are not driven by investor preferences for local or expertise stocks. Additionally,
we consider whether the impact of peers is di¤erent for local and expertise stocks.
We classify all stocks as being local to the individual if the distance from place of
residence of the individual to the stock headquarters is less than 100 km. We draw on
Døskeland and Hvide (2011) in dening expertise stocks. For each individual employed
in the private sector, our dataset contains an employer two-digit NACE code at year-end.
For each stock on the OSE, we have the primary NACE codes at year-end from 1996 to
2005. We dene an expertise stock as a stock where the worker two-digit NACE code
matches the NACE code of the stock.
19Examining the months that investors move shows that investors predominantly leave one job in
December and join a new one in January. The results in Table 3 includes investors that leave in December
and join in January while the results used to produce Figure 1 excludes these movers. Taken together
these result indicate that our results are robust to the fact that investors pre-dominantly move at the
turn of the year.
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In order to examine local and expertise purchases we create four dummy variables,
buylocal, buynon local; buyexpertise and buynon expertise that take the value 1 if the stock be-
ing purchased is local, non-local, expertise or non-expertise respectively. We estimate (1)
using our dummy variables as dependent variables. Specication (1) of Table 4 consid-
ers only local buys (i.e., uses buylocal as the dependent variable), while specication (2)
considers non-local buys. Specications (3) and (4) consider expertise and non-expertise
buys respectively. We include the same socio-demographic variables as in Table 2, month,
plant and postcode xed e¤ects. We also include zip code plant interaction xed e¤ects.
In all four specications, all three peer groups are statistically signicantly related to
the decision to make a stock purchase at the 1% level. It is noteworthy that the impact
of co-workers is greater for expertise stocks than for non-expertise stocks. A one standard
deviation increase in the fraction of co-workers that make a purchase results in an increase
in the probability that the investor makes an expertise (non-expertise) purchase by 0:47%
(0:43%), which represents a 248% (35%) change compared to the unconditional mean.
This suggest that co-workers are particularly important for the decision to purchase of
stock from the same industry as the investor works in.20
4 Stock Selection
The decision to purchase a particular stock can be seen as two consecutive decisions; rst
the decision to make a stock purchase and second the decision to purchase a particular
stock. In this section we consider the relation between investor stock selection and the
stock selection decisions of co-workers, family and neighbors.
To do this, we consider as dependent variable, fi;t;s, which is the fraction of total
purchases by investor i in month t invested in stock s. As main independent variables we
use the fraction of total purchases invested in stock s in month t by co-workers (F plantt;s ),
family (F familyt;s ) and neighbors (F
zip
t;s ). Descriptive statistics of our stock selection variables
are presented in Table 5. The mean fraction of total purchases invested in a stock is 0:48%
which makes intuitive sense since there are roughly 200 stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange
20The impact of co-workers is similar for local (46% relative to the unconditional mean) and non-local
stocks (47% ).
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over our sample period.
To relate investor stock selection to peer stock selection we estimate the following
regression,
fi;t;s =  + 1F
plant
t;s + 2F
family
t;s + 3F
zip
t;s + Stock Month+ "i;t;s (3)
where StockMonth is a stock month xed e¤ect to control for the economy-wide average
fraction invested in stock s in month t. The coe¢ cients 1, 2, and 3 tells us what is the
relation between purchases of the peer group and purchases of the individual investor when
the peer group and the investor make purchases. Since, we are considering purchases by
the individual and the peer group we are e¤ectively conditioning on both the investor and
the peer group being active.21 If we did not condition on making purchases our coe¢ cient
1 would combine the e¤ects of being active and stock selection. When estimating (3)
we therefore require that both the investor makes a purchase in that month and that his
peers make a purchase in the same month. In the year 2000, this leaves us with a sample
of 2; 824 individuals. It turns out that the restrictive selection criteria is that at least one
member of the family makes a purchase in that month.22 Footnote 23 describes our results
when considering a sample that abstracts from family peers (the sample is increased 14:5
times) to make a purchase.
Our regression results are presented in Table 6. Specications (1) to (3) considers
a single peer group, while specications (4) to (6) considers two peer groups simultane-
ously. Specication (7) includes all three peer groups. In all specications we include
monthstock xed e¤ects to control for time-varying economy wide buying pressure.
It is noticeable that introducing all three peer groups reduces the impact of neigh-
bors by 56:55% (comparing specication (3) to (7)), while the impact of the other two
groups are less a¤ected by the introduction of the other two groups. Considering speci-
cation (7) we can benchmark the relative impact of the three di¤erent peer groups on
21We consider buys rather than trade in a particular stock since very few individual investors go short
in a stock and therefore the selling decision is limited to a very small subset of stocks that is already
owned by the investor.
22The requirement that all peer groups have undertaken a trade implies that these individuals in general
belong to larger peer groups than the individuals in the trade analysis, but we have compared the socio
demographic variables of the two groups of individuals and in general they are similar.
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stock selection. A one standard deviation increase in co-worker purchases of a particular
stock increases the investor purchases by 0:96% (or 198% relative to the unconditional
mean). The corresponding numbers for family peers are astounding, a one standard de-
viation increase in family purchases of a stock increases investor purchases by 1:97% or
404:41% relative to the unconditional mean. A one standard deviation increase in neigh-
bor purchases of a stock results in the investor increases the fraction invested in the stock
by 0:33% or 69:55% relative to the unconditional mean. Additionally, when considering
specication (7) the Adjusted R2 is 0:263 indicating that peer e¤ects and stock month
xed e¤ects explain a signicant proportion of the stock selection decision. However, the
di¤erence in explanatory power between specication (4) and specication (7) is negligi-
ble (0:002) indicating that adding neighbors to co-workers and family negligibly increases
the explanatory power. Therefore, it may be the case that peer e¤ects documented in
the existing literature using zip code are predominantly driven by social interaction with
family and co-workers.
A potential explanation of our results is that workers at a particular plant have a
preference for a particular stock for reasons other than social interaction. For example,
this could be due to the plant using products or services of that particular company. In
specication (8) we introduce plantstock; zipstock and plantzipstock dummies to
control for stock preferences at the plant and the zip level. The introduction of these
xed e¤ects captures a substantial amount of variation, the Adjusted R2 has increased to
0:695 from 0:263. The point estimate of the co-worker peer e¤ect is reduced to 0:0777,
however the point estimate is still signicant at the 1% level. Now the economic e¤ect is
reduced to 77% relative to the unconditional mean.23
Overall, the ndings of Table 6 suggest that peer e¤ects are important for stock selec-
tion and even though all of the three peer group are important it is evident that co-workers
and family reduce the importance of neighbors. Additionally, the astounding economic
impact of family suggests that it is important to control for the inuence of family when
considering peer e¤ects.
23We re-estimated specication (5) on an expanded dataset that does not require that a family member
has made a purchase (resulting in 92; 440; 849 observations). The co-worker coe¢ cient (F plantt;s ) is 0:309
and the neighbor coe¢ cient (F zipt;s ) is 0:121, both which are similar to what we found in the above analysis.
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4.1 Changes in Place of work
In this section we consider the e¤ect of former and new co-workers on the stock selection
decision after the investor shifts plant. To examine movers in the trade analysis we
required that the investor shifts plant and at least one member of all of his peer groups
makes a purchases during the entire sample period. To consider all peer groups in the
stock analysis we would require the investor to shift plant and that at least one investor
in all of the peer groups trade in that particular month. This would result in a severely
limited sample and therefore we exclude family peers from this section.
We consider the same investor moves as we did in the trade analysis. That is, we require
(i) that the end and start date are both non-missing, (ii) the investor did not change place
of employment in the preceding year or does not change place of employment in the next
year, (iii) the investor moves at most 4 times between 1993 and 2005, and nally (iv) the
start date at the new place of work is later than the stop date at the previous plant.
In this analysis our main explanatory variables are the fractions invested in stock s in
month t by old (F olds;t ) and new (F
new
s;t ) co-workers, respectively. We interact these variables
with four dummy variables that take the value 1 if the date is before / after the stop /
start at the old / new plant and 0 otherwise. For example, the variable F old befores;t is the
fraction invested in stock s by old co-workers prior to the investor leaving the plant and
after the departure date the variable takes a value of 0. Our basic regression estimates
fi;t;s = +1F
old before
s;t +2F old afters;t +3F new befores;t +4F new afters:t +5F zipt;s +"i;t;s
Our results are presented in Table 7. In specications (1) we examine the impact of old
co-workers before and after the change in workplace. The stock selection of former co-
workers is positively related to the investors stock selection before and after the move. In
specication (2) we consider the impact of co-workers at the new plant before and after the
investor has started to work at the plant. The impact of new co-workers is signicantly
greater (an F statistic of 40:15) after the investor has started at the plant, suggesting
that increased interaction between individuals leads to similar stock selection decisions.
In specication (3) we combine the e¤ects past and new co-workers. The e¤ect of current
co-workers (at the old or the new plant) is roughly twice that of the e¤ect of past and
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future co-workers (F tests of the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients are highly signicant).
Similar to the trade section, we examine the evolution of the relation between co-
worker stock selection and investor stocks selection. We estimate the following regression
fi;t;s =  +
12X
j= 12
j  F plant oldt;s  j + 25  F zipt;s +"i;t;s (4)
where j is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is j months until the investor
leaves the plant and otherwise 0. Therefore interacting F plant oldt;s with j implies that we
can evaluate the impact of old (new) co-workers from 12 months before the move to 12
months after the move. We run one separate regression for the old plant and the new
plant. Additionally, we include stock-time xed e¤ects and time dummies.
In Figure 2 we have plotted the interacted peer coe¢ cient against the number of
months before the move. The e¤ect of old co-workers falls gradually following the depar-
ture from the old plant and the e¤ect of new co-workers increases rapidly following the
individuals start at the new plant.
4.2 Local and Expertise Trades
In this section we consider how stock selection by our peer groups relates to stock selection
of the investor when the stock is either local to the investor or in expertise area of the
investor. To do this we use the classication of local and expertise stocks introduced in
section 3:2. Panel B of Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the fractions invested
in local and expertise stocks by the individuals in our sample. We nd evidence of local
and expertise bias. The mean fraction of purchases invested in expertise stocks 1:30%
compared to 0:46% for non-expertise stocks. Similarly, the mean fraction invested in
local stocks is 0:68% while the mean fraction invested in non-local stocks is 0:39%.
In Table 8 we estimate (3) for local, non-local, expertise and non-expertise stocks in
specications (1) to (4). We include monthstock, plantstock, zip codestock and zip
codeplantstock xed e¤ects in all specications. It is reassuring to see that the impact
of peer e¤ects on stock selection is always statistically signicant at the 1% level.
The economic impact of co-workers is signicant in all specications, a one standard
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deviation increase in co-worker purchases results in an increase in the individuals alloca-
tion to stock s by at least 58:57% relative to the unconditional mean. It is noteworthy
that the t of specication (3) (expertise stocks) is signicantly larger than the other
specications suggesting that peer e¤ects are particularly important for explaining the
selection of stock in industries that the investor has expertise in. Overall our results
suggest that it is not local bias or expertise bias that is driving our results.
5 Should you listen to your co-workers?
In this section we investigate whether peer purchases are associated with abnormal perfor-
mance. We use the adapted calendar time methodology introduced by Hoechle, Schmid
and Zimmerman (2009) that allows for the introduction of continuous investor character-
istics. We consider a one month formation period, implying that we consider the return
of all buys made over the previous month and consider the return of these purchases over
the next month.24 A stock may have been purchased several times during the portfolio
formation period. If so, each purchase generates a separate position in the portfolio. Each
position is weighed equally. We estimate the following regression,
rs;t =  + 1  buyplantt 1 + 2  buyfamilyt 1 + 3  buyzipt 1 + b + "i;t
where rs;t is the excess return of stock s in month t over the three month Norwegian Inter-
bank O¤ered Rate (NIBOR). Our explanatory variables buyplantt 1 , buy
family
t 1 and buy
zip
t 1 are
the fraction of co-workers, family and neighbors that make a purchase in the formation
month. Our vector of control variables   includes the risk factors MRKT , HML, SMB
and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (all of them calculated for Norway).25
Our regression results are presented in Table 9. In all of our specications, purchases
by co-workers are not associated with abnormal investor performance. However, there
seems to a negative relation between neighbor purchases and the performance of the
24We have also considered formation periods of 1 and 12 months, the results are qualitatively very
similar.
25We are grateful to Bernt Arne Ødegaard for providing the factors. The factor data is described in
Ødegaard (2009).
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individual. This suggests that investing when local sentiment is positive is detrimental to
performance. Specications, (2), (3) and (4) verify that there is no signicant abnormal
performance for local or expertise purchases.
We have veried (in unreported analysis) that the lack of abnormal performance asso-
ciated with peer purchases is not due to the inclusion of risk factors, sentiment purchases
or the one month formation period.26
26The results are qualittatively unchanged with four and 12 month formation periods.
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6 Conclusion
Portfolio theory predicts that investors should invest in risky assets according to the
weight that these assets represent in the market portfolio. Although portfolio theory is
of considerable normative value, the literature has documented an abundant number of
empirical deviations.27 Motivated by the social psychology literature which emphasizes
the strength of face-to-face communication between individuals that frequently interact
in a¤ecting behavior, we ask whether co-workers can explain some of the unexplained
portion of stock market behavior by individuals. To examine this question, we use an
exceptionally detailed data set from Norway that combines matched employer-employee
panel data with common stock transaction data over a 10-year period. Our results suggest
large e¤ects of co-workers both on the decision to purchase a stock and the decision which
stock to purchase. The results are robust to accounting for unobserved plant, geographical,
stock and time heterogeneity at the plant, geographical, and stock level. They are also
robust to including measures of peer e¤ects at the geographical and family level. In sum,
our results provide strong evidence that individualsstock purchase decisions are related
to those made by their co-workers due to social interaction.
A methodological innovation of the paper is to examine three types of peer e¤ects
simultaneously: in the workplace, in the family, and in the neighborhood. This allows us
to control for family and neighborhood peer e¤ects in our analysis of workplace peer e¤ects.
It also allows us to compare the magnitude of the di¤erent types of peer e¤ects and perform
a "horse race" between them. We nd that neighborhood e¤ects can be important,
consistent with Ivkovic and Weissbenner (2007), but obtain more unequivocal a¢ rmative
results for the e¤ects of social interaction in the workplace and, less surprisingly, in the
family.
Our results contribute to an ongoing debate on the role of social interaction in the
stock market. While the literature on institutional investors nds strong evidence of
social interaction and network e¤ects among institutional investors, the evidence on social
interaction among individual investors has been more mixed. We consider a novel channel
27For example, individual investors are biased in favour of domestic stocks (French and Poterba, 1991),
local stocks (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999 and Huberman, 2001) and stocks from their industry of employ-
ment (Døskeland and Hvide, 2011).
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for peer e¤ects; the workplace, and contribute to the literature by showing that co-worker
investment decisions can explain a substantial amount of heterogeneity in individual asset
allocation decisions. As discussed in Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2002), it is
often important for policy purposes to separate individual and social multiplier e¤ects,
the reason being that the aggregate impact of intervention may be larger than the sum
of its e¤ects on each individuals decision. Consistent with the ndings of Duo and Saez
(2003) in the context of retirement plans, our results suggest that the social multiplier in
the workplace is large both in absolute and relative terms when it comes to stock market
behavior.
Our ndings suggests the possibility that puzzling voluntary investments in company
stock (e.g., Benartzi, 2001) may be partially driven by peer e¤ects at the rm level:
one obvious object of workplace conversations is the stock market performance of the
employers stock. An interesting question for future work is whether investments in own-
company stock relates to proxies for social interaction among employees, such as the
amount of time employees spend together outside work, or the extent to which leisure
time interests such as reading novels or going to the gym are shared.
Kedia and Rajgopal (2012) nd evidence consistent with social interaction between
rms in the adoption of stock option grants. Another extension of the current work
would be to investigate whether social interaction e¤ects between plants also exist for
the decision to purchase stocks and the decision which stock to purchase.28 For example,
it would be interesting to see whether trading behavior is correlated between plants in
the same industry and region. This research might be one step in the direction of better
understanding contagion e¤ects in stock markets.
28In future work, we would also be interested in examining whether intra-plant and inter-plant social
interaction can explain patterns in stock market participation. The results of Brown et. al (2008) and
Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) suggest that this is a promising avenue for research.
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Figure 1: New and former co-workers 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The above figure plots the slope coefficients from regression equation (2). We run a regression where the dependent variable is the dummy variable Buy that takes the value 1 
if the investor makes a purchase in that month and 0 otherwise. Our main independent variables is the fraction of old (new) co-workers that make a purchase in month t interacted with 
25 dummy variables, one for each of the 12 months prior to and after leaving (joining) the old (new) plant. We average two consecutive coefficients and we exclude investors that leave 
their job in December and join the new plant in January. 
28 
 
Figure 2: Stock selection new and former co-workers 
 
 
Figure 2: The above figure plots the slope coefficients from regression equation (4). We run a regression where the dependent variable is, ft,s, the fraction invested by the investor in stock s in 
month t. Our main independent variables is the fraction invested in stock s in month t of old (new) co-workers interacted with 25 dummy variables, one for each of the 12 months prior to and 
after leaving (joining) the old (new) plant. We average two consecutive coefficients and similar to Figure 1 we exclude investors that leave their job in December and join the new plant in 
January. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Definitions of Regression Variables 
 
 
Variable Description of Variable
Trade Variables (monthly) 
buy Takes the value 1 if the investor makes a stock purchase otherwise 0. 
buyplant The fraction of co-workers that make a purchase.
buyfamily The fraction of family members that make a purchase.
buyzip The fraction of neighbors living in the same zip code that makes a purchase.
  
Stock Selection Variables (monthly)
f The fraction of total investor purchases invested in stock s. 
Fplant The fraction of total co-worker purchases invested in stock s. 
Ffamily The fraction of total family purchases invested in stock s. 
Fzip The fraction of total neighbor purchases invested in stock s. 
  
Individual-Stock Variables (yearly) 
Local stock A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the headquarters of the stock is 
located within 100km of the place of residence of the investor, otherwise 0.
Expertise stock A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor's two digit NACE code 
of employment matches the two digit NACE code of the stock, otherwise 0.
  
Socio-demographic Control Variables (yearly)
Income The yearly income as reported in the individual’s tax return. Reported in 
Norwegian Kroner. 
Wealth The total wealth reported in the individual’s tax return for the year. Reported 
in Norwegian Kroner.
Age Investor age at the end of the year.
Male A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is male and 0 
otherwise. 
Education The number of completed years of schooling.
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Appendix  
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Peer groups and Socio-demographic Variables in 2000 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the individuals that are in our sample in year 2000. The rows plant size, family size and zip 
size present descriptive statistics on the size of the individual’s plant, family and zip code respectively. The rows Plant investors, 
Family investors and Zip investors presents descriptive statistics on the number of peers in the individuals respective peer groups (i.e., 
individuals that trade at least once over the period 1994 to 2005). Additionally, we provide descriptive statistics on the socio-
demographic variables wealth, income, age, male and education.  
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N
Plant size 356.15 50 911.95 2 5811 170,499
Family size 7.41 6 5.05 2 120 170,499
Zip size 3242.18 2428 2521.25 4 12671 170,499
Plant investors 153.58 17 414.12 1 2465 170,499
Family investors 2.57 2 1.95 1 42 170,499
Zip investors 454.56 325 400.54 1 2239 170,499
Wealth (NOK) 563,028.00 278,630 6,956,396.00 10,000 2,127,096,064 170,499
Income (NOK) 353,904.00 312,700 221,713.00 11,100 32,798,800 170,499
Age 38.56 38 8.50 21 65 170,499
Male  0.71 1 0.46 0 1 170,499
Education 12.81 12 3.02 0 21 170,499
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Table A3: Industry Decomposition of Investors, Firms and Co-worker Peer effects 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the industries that our investors work in (column 2) and the industries that are represented 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange (column 3). Additionally, we decompose the co-worker peer effect depending on the industry of 
employment of the investor. Financial firms, NACE codes 65, 66 and 67 have been excluded from the sample. For this table, we only 
consider industries that represent at least 0.5% of investor observations (i.e., the industry has at least roughly 1,600 investors). This 
restriction implies a loss of less than 6% of the complete sample. To decompose the co-worker peer effect across industries we 
estimate the following regression 
ܾݑݕ௜,௧ = ߙ + ෍ ߚ௝
ଷ଺
௝ୀଵ
ܾݑݕ௧௣௟௔௡௧ × ܫ௝ + ߚଷ଻ܾݑݕ௧௙௔௠௜௟௬ + ߚଷ଼ܾݑݕ௧௭௜௣ + ࢈ࢣ + ߝ௜,௧ 
where Ij is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the investor works in industry j and 0 otherwise. Column 4 reports our point 
estimates of the peer effect for our 36 industries. The vector ࢣ of control variables includes the socio demographic control variables 
listed in the caption to Table 2. In addition to time (month), plant and zip fixed effects; we include zip plant interaction fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. T-values are reported in column 5. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We use a 20% sample of all investor months for which peer groups are defined and socio 
demographic variables are non-missing. 
 
Industry (NACE code) Investors OSE Firms Coefficient t-stat
Oil and gas extraction. Oil and gas services (11) 10,327 19 0.257*** (5.85)
Food products and beverages (15) 7,874 4 0.187*** (6.61)
Wood and wood products (20) 2,507 2 0.035 (1.13)
Publishing, printing, reproduction (22) 4,601 5 0.117*** (4.56)
Chemicals and chemical products (24) 3,123 2 0.984*** (36.27)
Rubber and plastic products (25) 1,214 0 0.139*** (2.71)
Other non-metallic mineral products (26) 1,870 2 0.110*** (2.67)
Basic metals (27) 1,380 2 0.286*** (3.16)
Fabricated metal products (28) 3,549 1 0.060** (2.05)
Machinery and equipment (29) 5,107 7 0.126*** (5.59)
Electrical machinery and apparatus (31) 2,095 4 0.310*** (5.33)
Radio, TV, communication equip (32) 1,063 7 0.805*** (9.89)
Instruments, watches and clocks (33) 1,537 4 0.077** (1.98)
Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-tr.(34) 1,366 2 0.896*** (21.86)
Other transport equipment (35) 7,656 2 0.434*** (11.23)
Furniture, manufacturing (36) 1,845 4 0.067* (1.86)
Electricity, gas and water supply (40) 4,044 3 0.081*** (2.91)
Construction (45)  25,163 2 0.015 (1.64)
Motor vehicle services (50) 7,697 0 0.033** (2.47)
Wholesale trade, commission trade (51) 23,878 8 0.173*** (14.64)
Retail trade, repair personal goods (52) 14,794 6 0.027** (2.40)
Hotels and restaurants (55) 5,535 2 0.017 (0.58)
Land transport, pipeline transport (60) 6,612 2 0.043 (1.60)
Water transport (61)  5,211 42 0.474*** (10.81)
Air transport (62) 2,486 2 0.086* (1.73)
Services for transport and travel agencies (63) 5,406 0 0.099*** (5.10)
Post and telecommunications (64) 7,566 5 0.680*** (24.84)
Real estate activities (70) 3,897 8 0.190*** (8.19)
Computers and related activities (72) 12,060 20 0.263*** (15.45)
Research and development (73) 2,960 3 0.369*** (7.37)
Other business activities (74) 30,674 8 0.101*** (11.18)
Public administration, defense and social security (75) 28,874 0 0.008 (0.67)
Education (80) 24,833 0 -0.011 (-1.13)
Health and social services (85) 35,356 0 -0.017* (-1.65)
Interest groups (91) 2,857 0 -0.003 (-0.22)
Cultural and sporting activities (92) 3,966 2 0.035* (1.81)
Total 310,983 180 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on investor and peer trading 
 
We present descriptive statistics on trading of individuals and their peers. In Panel A, buy is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the individual trades in month t, otherwise it is 0. buyplant, buyfamily and buyzip are the fraction of plant, family and zip code peers that 
make a stock purchase in month t. In Panel B we consider the individual’s trading of local and expertise stocks (used in Table 3). 
buyexpertise , buynon-expertise, buylocal and buynon-local takes the value 1 if the individual purchases an expertise, non-expertise, local and non-
local stock in month t, respectively. A local stock is headquartered closer than 100 km to the residence of the individual. An expertise 
stock is a stock that has the same two digit NACE code as the firm that employs the individual. We use a 20% sample of all investor 
months for which peer groups are defined and socio demographic variables are non-missing. 
 
Panel A: Trading of individuals and peers 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Individual trading  
buy 0.0212 0.0000 0.1440 0 1 4,580,530 
   
Peer trading  
buyplant 0.0197 0.0000 0.0632 0 1 4,580,530 
buyfamily 0.0093 0.0000 0.0714 0 1 4,580,530 
buyzip 0.0183 0.0148 0.0163 0 1 4,580,530 
 
 
 
Panel B: Individual trading in local and expertise stocks 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Individual trading  
buyexpertise 0.0019 0.0000 0.0436 0 1 4,506,903 
buynon-expertise 0.0120 0.0000 0.1092 0 1 4,506,903 
buylocal 0.0095 0.0000 0.0968 0 1 4,537,550 
buynon-local 0.0112 0.0000 0.1052 0 1 4,537,550 
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Table 2: Peer and Investor Trading  
 
We present results from pooled panel regressions relating investor buys to the fraction of peers that buy in month t. The dependent variable is the dummy 
variable buy that takes the value 1 if the investor makes a purchase in that month and 0 otherwise. buyplant , buyfamily and buyzip is the fraction of plant, family and 
zip code peers that make a stock purchase in month t. The socio-demographic variables that we control for are: Age, Age2, LogIncome, LogIncome2, 
LogIncome3, LogWealth, LogWealth2, LogWealth3, LogIncome×LogWealth, Male and Education. In addition to time (month), two digit NACE code (of investor 
plant), plant and zip code fixed effects, we include zip-plant interaction fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values are reported in 
parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We use a 20% sample of all investor months for which 
peer groups are defined and socio demographic variables are non-missing. Variables are described in Appendix.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 buy buy buy buy buy buy buy
buyplant 0.181*** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.171***
 (45.89) (44.67) (45.39) (43.65)
  
buyfamily 0.0892*** 0.0820*** 0.0877*** 0.0823***
 (36.57) (33.87) (36.09) (33.82)
  
buyzip 0.346***  0.280*** 0.329*** 0.267***
 (23.97)  (20.52) (22.92) (19.60)
  
Constant  1.848*** 1.789*** 1.811*** 1.833*** 1.853*** 1.794*** 0.0006
 (3.77) (3.64) (3.68) (3.74) (3.77) (3.64) (1.12)
  
Socio demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry  FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  
N 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530 4,580,530
Adj. R2 0.207 0.204 0.203 0.208 0.207 0.204 0.204
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Table 3: New and Former Co-workers 
 
We examine the relative impact of new and former co-workers before and after the investor leaves (joins) the old (new) 
plant. To do so, we create two dummy variables that take the value of 1 for months before (after) the investor leaves the 
old plant and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we create two dummy variables that take the value of 1 for months before (after) 
the investor joins the new plant and 0 otherwise. We interact these four dummy variables with ܾݑݕ௧௣௟௔௡௧ to generate the 
independent variables ܾݑݕݐ݋݈݀ ܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁, ܾݑݕ௧௢௟ௗ ௔௙௧௘௥ , ܾݑݕ௧௡௘௪ ௕௘௙௢௥௘ and ܾݑݕ௧௡௘௪ ௔௙௧௘௥. We estimate the OLS regression: 
 
ܾݑݕ௜,௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܾݑݕ௧௢௟ௗ ௕௘௙௢௥௘ + ߚଶܾݑݕ௧௢௟ௗ ௔௙௧௘௥ + ߚଷܾݑݕ௧௡௘௪ ௕௘௙௢௥௘ + ߚସܾݑݕ௧௡௘௪ ௔௙௧௘௥ + ߚହܾݑݕ௧௙௔௠௜௟௬ + ߚ଺ܾݑݕ௧௭௜௣ + ࢈ࢣ + ߝ௜,௧ 
 
where ࢣ includes the socio demographic variables listed in the caption to Table 2. In addition to month, plant and zip 
code fixed effects; we include zip×plant fixed effects. We also include dummies for the number of months before 
leaving from old job (time prior leaving), and dummies for the number of months prior to joining new job (time prior 
joining). There is one dummy variable for each month starting from 12 months before the investor leaves (joins) the old 
(new) plant to 12 months after (month 0 is omitted). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values in 
parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3)
 buy buy buy
buy୲୭୪ୢ ୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ 0.270*** 0.340*** 
 (14.40) (10.37) 
 
buy୲୭୪ୢ ୟ୤୲ୣ୰ 0.159*** 0.142*** 
 (7.41) (6.49) 
 
buy୲୬ୣ୵ ୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ 0.116*** 0.0545*** 
 (6.59) (2.79) 
 
buy୲୬ୣ୵ ୟ୤୲ୣ୰  0.332*** 0.386*** 
 (20.89) (15.38) 
 
buy୲୤ୟ୫୧୪୷ 0.0750*** 0.0725*** 0.0761*** 
 (11.37) (10.28) (8.15) 
 
buy୲୸୧୮ 0.152*** 0.126*** 0.113*** 
 (5.79) (4.84) (3.04) 
 
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Socio demographic Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes
Time prior leaving FE Yes No Yes
Time prior joining FE No Yes Yes
 
N 623,384 623,707 330,443 
Adj. R2 0.296 0.291 0.300 
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Table 4: Trading of Local and Expertise Stocks 
 
We investigate the relation between the fraction of peers making a purchase and investor purchases. We 
estimate the same regression as in Table 2, but consider different dependent variables. In (1), the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the investor buys a local stock (stocks headquartered 
closer than 100 km to the individual). In (2), the dependent dummy variable takes the value 1 if the investor 
purchases a stock that is not local. In (3), the dependent dummy variable takes the value 1 if the investor 
purchases a stock that he has expertise in  (defined as in Døskeland and Hvide, 2011), while in (4) the dummy 
variable takes the value 1 if the individual purchases a stock that he does not have expertise in. The socio 
demographic variables that we control for are listed in the caption to Table 2. In addition to month, plant and zip 
fixed effects, we include zip×plant fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values in 
parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We use 
a 20% sample of all individual months for which peer groups are defined and socio demographic variables are 
non-missing. Variables are described in Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Local Non-local Expertise Non-expertise 
buyplant 0.0825*** 0.0775*** 0.0760*** 0.0688*** 
 (32.57) (26.30) (32.69) (24.15) 
   
buyfamily 0.0381*** 0.0411*** 0.00389*** 0.0432*** 
 (24.19) (22.46) (5.06) (23.81) 
   
buyzip 0.156*** 0.101*** 0.0900*** 0.0854*** 
 (20.12) (8.76) (10.16) (10.36) 
   
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Socio demographic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 4,537,550 4,537,550 4,506,903 4,506,903 
Adj. R2 0.205 0.160 0.114 0.204 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics on investor and peer stock selection 
 
In Panel A we present descriptive statistics on the stock selection decision of individuals and peers. f is the 
fraction invested by investor i in stock s in month t. Fplant , Ffamily and Fzip is the average fraction invested in 
stock s in month t by plant, family and zip code peers respectively. In Panel B we examine individual stock 
selection of expertise, non-expertise, local and non-local stocks (examined in Table 8). A local stock is 
headquartered less than 100km from the residence of the individual. Expertise stocks have the same two digit 
NACE code as the employer of the individual. 
 
 
Panel A: Individual and peer stock selection 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Individual stock selection   
f 0.0049 0 0.0609 0 1 6,522,816
    
Peer stock selection   
Fplant 0.0049 0 0.0479 0 1 6,522,816
Ffamily 0.0049 0 0.0596 0 1 6,522,816
Fzip 0.0049 0 0.0319 0 1 6,522,816
 
 
 
Panel B: Stock selection of local and expertise stocks 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Individual stock selection   
fexpertise 0.0130 0 0.1042 0 1 177,827
fnon-expertise 0.0046 0 0.0592 0 1 6,344,989
flocal 0.0068 0 0.0729 0 1 2,102,794
fnon-local 0.0039 0 0.0543 0 1 4,420,022
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Table 6: Peer Effects and Stock Selection 
 
We present the results of pooled panel regressions relating the fraction of purchases invested in a particular stock by the investor to the fractions invested in that 
stock by the investor’s peers. The dependent variable f is the fraction of total purchases invested in stock s in month t by the investor. Fplant , Ffamily and Fzip is the 
average fraction invested in stock s in month t by plant, family and zip code peers respectively. We include month×stock fixed effects in all specifications. In 
specification (8) we also include, plant×stock, zip×stock, and zip×plant×stock fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values in 
parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are described in Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 f f f f f f f f
Fplant 0.294*** 0.209*** 0.279*** 0.201*** 0.0777***
(57.77) (46.91) (56.42) (45.59) (9.65)
 
Ffamily 0.369*** 0.335***  0.360*** 0.330*** 0.212***
(83.79) (78.81)  (82.75) (77.73) (24.44)
 
Fzip 0.244*** 0.177*** 0.145*** 0.106*** 0.0441***
(37.48) (34.29) (29.96) (24.76) (5.92)
 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time×Stock FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant×Stock FE No No No No No No No Yes
Zip×Stock FE No No No No No No No Yes
 
N 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,522,816 6,344,989
Adj. R2 0.174 0.239 0.141 0.261 0.18 0.243 0.263 0.695
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Table 7: Stock Selection, New and Former Co-workers 
 
We examine the relative impact of new and former co-workers before and after the investor leaves (joins) the 
old (new) plant (as in Table 3). To do so, we create two dummy variables that take the value of 1 for months 
before (after) the investor leaves the old plant and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we create two dummy variables that 
take the value of 1 for months before (after) the investor joins the new plant and 0 otherwise. We interact these 
four dummy variables with the variable ܨ௧,௦௣௟௔௡௧ to generate the independent variables ܨ௧,௦௢௟ௗ ௕௘௙௢௥௘, ܨ௧,௦௢௟ௗ ௔௙௧௘௥ , ܨ௧,௦௡௘௪ ௕௘௙௢௥௘ 
and ܨ௧,௦௡௘௪ ௔௙௧௘௥. We estimate: 
 
௜݂,௧,௦ = ߙ + ߚଵܨ௧,௦௢௟ௗ ௕௘௙௢௥௘ + ߚଶܨ௧,௦௢௟ௗ ௔௙௧௘௥ + ߚଷܨ௧,௦௡௘௪ ௕௘௙௢௥௘ + ߚସܨ௧,௦௡௘௪ ௔௙௧௘௥ + ߚହܨ௧,௦௭௜௣ + ߝ௜,௧,௦ 
 
where ௜݂,௧,௦ is the fraction of month t purchases invested in stock s by investor i. Fzip is the average fraction 
invested in stock s in month t by zip code peers. We include month×stock fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level (t-values in parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are described in Appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 f f f
F୲୭୪ୢ ୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ 0.225*** 0.227*** 
 (27.25) (13.27) 
 
F୲୭୪ୢ ୟ୤୲ୣ୰ 0.228*** 0.129*** 
 (13.60) (7.07) 
 
F୲୬ୣ୵ ୠୣ୤୭୰ୣ 0.157*** 0.0974*** 
 (14.38) (6.98) 
 
F୲୬ୣ୵ ୟ୤୲ୣ୰ 0.230*** 0.221*** 
 (28.89) (14.40) 
 
F୲୸୧୮ 0.0836*** 0.0810*** 0.0687*** 
 (11.68) (12.20) (6.59) 
 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
Time×Stock FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
N 2,117,599 2,630,630 969,292 
Adj. R2 0.173 0.173 0.235 
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Table 8: Stock Selection of Local and Expertise Stocks 
 
We investigate the relation between the stock selection of peers and the stock selection of investors in local and 
expertise stocks. The dependent variable ௜݂,௧,௦ is the fraction of total purchases invested in stock s in month t by 
investor i. Fplant , Ffamily and Fzip is the average fraction invested in stock s in month t by plant, family and zip 
code peers respectively. In specification (1), we only consider stocks that are local to the investor (stocks 
headquartered closer than 100 km to the investor); thus our dependent variable ௜݂,௧,௦ measures the fraction of 
local purchases invested by the individual in stocks s. In specification (2), we only consider non-local stocks. 
Specification (3) considers only expertise stocks (defined as in Døskeland and Hvide, 2011), while specification 
(4) considers non-expertise stocks. We include month×stock, plant×stock, zip×stock, and zip×plant×stock fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (t-values in parentheses). *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Variables are described in Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Local Non-Local Expertise Non-Expertise 
F୲୮୪ୟ୬୲ 0.0701*** 0.0863*** 0.109*** 0.0777*** 
 (7.34) (8.31) (3.61) (9.65) 
   
F୲୤ୟ୫୧୪୷ 0.211*** 0.202*** 0.151*** 0.212*** 
 (17.39) (21.27) (6.22) (24.44) 
   
F୲୸୧୮ 0.0259*** 0.0540*** 0.0649** 0.0441*** 
 (2.62) (5.39) (1.98) (5.92) 
   
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time×Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Plant×Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zip×Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 2,102,794 4,420,022 177,827 6,344,989 
Adj. R2 0.737 0.685 0.860 0.695 
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Table 9: Returns to Peer Trading 
 
We present regression results relating peer buying pressure to returns. We use calendar time portfolio 
methodology by applying the Hoechle, Schmid and Zimmerman (2009) implementation which allows for the 
introduction of continuous investor characteristics. Our dependent variable is the monthly excess return of stock 
s over the three month Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR). Our main independent variables are 
ܾݑݕ௧ିଵ௣௟௔௡௧, ܾݑݕ௧ିଵ௙௔௠௜௟௬, ܾݑݕ௧ିଵ௭௜௣, the fraction of co-workers, family members and neighbors that make a purchase in 
month t-1, respectively. All specifications include the factors MRKT, HML, SMB and the Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor (all of them calculated for Norway). Local stock and Expertise stock are dummy variables 
that take the value 1 if the stock is local (headquarters within 100 km) to the investor or a stock that the investor 
has expertise (same two digit NACE code) in, respectively. T-values are based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
standard errors and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 return return return return 
buy୲ିଵ୮୪ୟ୬୲ -0.00372 -0.00309 -0.00726 -0.00124 
 (-1.30) (-1.07) (-0.73) (-0.38) 
   
buy୲ିଵ୤ୟ୫୧୪୷ -0.00174 -0.00197 -0.00771 -0.00157 
 (-0.73) (-0.83) (-1.15) (-0.43) 
   
buy୲ିଵ୸୧୮  -0.450*** -0.445*** -0.473** -0.366** 
 (-2.66) (-2.60) (-2.39) (-2.05) 
   
Local stock  0.000987 -0.00452  
  (0.38) (-0.95)  
   
Expertise stock  -0.00155 -0.00471 
  (-0.45) (-1.06) 
   
Constant 0.00766 0.00761 0.00988 0.00687 
 (1.14) (1.15) (1.12) (1.02) 
   
Risk factors Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 947,891 918,560 45,544 318,665 
Adj. R2 0.215 0.217 0.244 0.247 
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